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Defending Progressive Prosecution:A Review of Char ed by Emily a elon
Jeffrey BellinCHARGED: THE NEWMOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM AMERICAN PROSEC TION AND ENDMASS INCARCERATION. y Emily a elon. New York: Random House. 2019.448 pp. $24.99.
Pro ressive prosecutors are takin over District Attorney s ffices
across the nation with a mandate to reform the criminal ustice system from
the inside. Emily Ba elon s new book, Charged: The New Movement toTransform American Prosecution and End Mass Incarceration, chronicles
this potentially transformative moment in American criminal ustice.
his Essay hi hli hts the importance of Charged to modern criminal
ustice debates and levera es its concrete framin to offer a enerally
applicable theory of prosecutor driven criminal ustice reform. he theory
seeks to reconcile reformers newfound embrace of prosecutorial discretion
with lon standin worries, both inside and outside the academy, about the
dan erous accumulation of prosecutorial power. t also offers the potential
to broaden the reformmovement s appeal beyond pro ressive urisdictions.INTROD CTION.......................................................................................................................219I. TWO FACES OF PROSEC TORIAL POWER ..................................................................227
A. Kevin ...................................................................................................................
B. oura Jackson ....................................................................................................II. ILDING ANEWNARRATIVE.....................................................................................243CONCL SION ...........................................................................................................................247
Professor, William Mary Law School. Thanks to Emily a elon, AdamGershowit , and participants in the Duke Law School Criminal ustice ooksConference for comments.
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INTROD CTIONThe familiar concept of checks and balances captures the ideal of theAmerican criminal ustice system.1 Legislatures legislate, police arrest,grand uries charge, prosecutors prosecute, uries convict, udges sentence,parole boards release, governors pardon. The redundancy is the point. Theinvolvement of a multitude of independent actors guards against abuse ofthe State’s most dangerous power: the power to punish.For the past several decades, criminal ustice commentators mournedthe loss of checks and balances. Mandatory sentences removed udicialdiscretion.2 Trials disappeared.3 Legislatures abolished parole.4 Pardonsbecame infrequent.5 Power accumulated in the hands of a single shadowyactor, the prosecutor. Iconic legal scholar William Stunt observed in 2001that, in the modern American system, checks and balances are anillusion. 6 The criminal ustice system seems characteri ed by diffused
1. See Richard A. ierschbach Stephanos ibas, Constitutionally ailorin
Punishment, 112 MICH. L. REV. 397, 399 (2013) ( Checks and balances areessential not only to the separation of powers in criminal ustice but also tothe promotion of morally appropriate punishments. ) Daniel S. McConkie,
Structurin Pre Plea Criminal Discovery, 107 . CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 1, 8(2017) ( The criminal ustice system has historically had its own system ofchecks and balances between the legislature, prosecutors, trial udges, andthe trial ury. ).2. Michael A. Simons, Prosecutors as Punishment heorists Seekin Sentencin
Justice, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 303, 354 (2009) ( Sentencing enhancementsand mandatory minimum sentences give prosecutors undeniable power. ).3. Robert . Conrad, r. aty L. Clements, he anishin Criminal Jury rial
From rial Jud es to Sentencin Jud es, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 103 (2018)(documenting a decrease in criminal trials in the years 2006-16).4. See Graham v. Florida, 560 .S. 48, 109 10 (2010) (Thomas, ., dissenting)(noting that through the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congressabolished parole for federal offenders and several States have followedsuit ).5. Rachel E. arkow, he Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of
Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1348-49 (2008) ( T he percentage of federalgrants of clemency applications has declined sharply and s tate levelpardons have also fallen in recent decades. ).6. William . Stunt , he Patholo ical Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.505, 599 (2001)
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power, but its real difficulty is that it concentrates power in prosecutors. 7Today, Stunt ’s view stands triumphant. Commentators assail theprosecutor king 8 who presides over the criminal ustice system, wieldingvirtually unchecked powers 9 to generate mass incarceration and fosterin ustice.10The prosecutor-king narrative takes an intriguing turn in an excellentnew book by Emily a elon, Char ed he ew Movement to ransform
American Prosecution and End Mass ncarceration.11 a elon, a New YorkTimes ournalist and member of the Yale Law School faculty, begins withthe familiar critique. a elon argues in her Introduction that Americanprosecutors use their breathtaking power to generate disastrous resultsfor millions of people churning through the criminal ustice system. 12 Thenovelty of Char ed is that it goes on to make a compelling case that thesolution to the system’s many problems is for prosecutors to take on an
even more prominent role. To dethrone the kings of the courtroom, 13commentators like Stunt urged legislators, udges, and other actors tocreate more robust checks on prosecutor power.14 Flipping the script,
7. d.8. See, e. ., Erik Luna, Prosecutor Kin , 1 STAN. . CRIM. L. POL’Y 48 (2014).9. enneth Rosenthal, Prosecutor Misconduct, Convictions, and Double Jeopardy
Case Studies in an Emer in Jurisprudence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 887, 887 (1998).10. See ANGELA . DAVIS, AR ITRARY STICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSEC TOR17 (2007) ( P rosecutorial discretion is largely responsible for thetremendous in ustices in our criminal ustice system. ) OHN F. PFAFF, LOC EDIN: THE TR E CA SES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM206 (2017) ( Prosecutors have been and remain the engines driving massincarceration. ) Erik Luna Marianne Wade, ntroduction to Prosecutorial
Power A ransnational Symposium, 67 WASH. LEE L. REV. 1285, 1285 (2010)( P rosecutors are the criminal ustice system. ).11. EMILY AZELON, CHARGED: THE NEW MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM AMERICANPROSEC TION AND ENDMASS INCARCERATION (2019).12. d. at xxv.13. he Kin s of the Courtroom, ECONOMIST (Oct. 4, 2014),https: www.economist.com united-states 2014 10 04 the-kings-of-the-courtroom https: perma.cc S2G - 3 .14. See Stunt , supra note 6, at 587 ( The last, and probably best, solution is toincrease udicial power over criminal law. ) see also RACHEL ELISE AR OW,PRISONERS OF POLITICS 9 (2019) ( One key pillar of reform is to institutegreater checks on prosecutors. ) PFAFF, supra note 10, at 159 (emphasi ingthe need to regulate prosecutors’ behavior as the key to reform).
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Char ed calls upon prosecutors to counteract the system’s severity bytaking decisions out of the hands of udges, uries, legislators, and police.a elon explains: The power of the D.A. makes him or her the actorthe only actor who can start to fix what’s broken without changing asingle law. 15a elon is no outlier. Char ed highlights a ma or new phenomenonthat threatens to upend the longstanding academic consensus. Outside theivory halls, the reform conversation no longer centers prosecutorial poweras the disease afflicting the criminal ustice system. Prosecutors are thecure. The Darth Vader of criminal ustice commentary has become itsCaptain Marvel.16
Char ed skillfully narrates the di ying developments of the past twoyears that changed the criminal ustice reform conversation. Self-proclaimed progressive prosecutors are winning elections in ma orAmerican cities, spearheading a national movement to leverageprosecutorial power to achieve criminal ustice reform. 17 Larry rasner inPhiladelphia. im Foxx in Chicago. Marilyn Mosby in altimore. RachelRollins in oston. Chesa oudin in San Francisco. ohn Creu ot in Dallas.18
15. AZELON, supra note 11, at xxvii see also id. at 296 ( The movement to elect anew kind of prosecutor is the most promising means of reform I see on thepolitical landscape. ).16. effrey ellin, Reassessin Prosecutorial Power hrou h the Lens of Mass
ncarceration, 116 MICH. L. REV. 835, 837 (2018) ( Prosecutors are the DarthVader of academic writing: mysterious, powerful and, for the most part,bad. ) hereinafter ellin, Reassessin Prosecutorial Power . Darth Vader isthe villain in the Star Wars movies Captain Marvel is the most powerfulAvenger superhero. See Anyone nder 30.17. See effrey ellin, heories of Prosecution, 108 CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2020)hereinafter ellin, heories of Prosecution Angela . Davis, Reima inin
Prosecution A Growin Pro ressive Movement, 3 CLA CRIM. ST. L. REV. 1, 2-3(2019) (arguing that progressive prosecutors us e their power anddiscretion with the goals of not only enforcing the law, but also reducingmass incarceration, eliminating racial disparities, and seeking ustice for all,including the accused ) David Sklansky, he Pro ressive Prosecutor s
Handbook, 50 .C. DAVIS L. REV. Online 25 (2017) (discussing the movement)Editorial oard, A Wiser Generation of Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2017),https: www.nytimes.com 2017 02 06 opinion a-wiser-generation-of-prosecutors.html https: perma.cc E8Z-T2MZ (embracing the new waveof local prosecutors who are open to rethinking how they do theirenormously influential obs ).18. See Farah Stockman, How End Mass ncarceration Became a Slo an for D.A.
Candidates, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2018),
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The list is long and growing. a elon estimates that, already, 12 percent ofthe population live s in a city or county with a D.A. who . . . could beconsidered a reformer. 19 With progressive prosecutors taking the helm,traditional academic proposals to limit prosecutorial power seemincreasingly pass .20 Reformers no longer cry out for checks onprosecutors. Instead, they want everyone to get out of prosecutors’ way.
Char ed does as good a ob as any book in recent memory of weavingtogether individual stories, timely reporting, and the latest criminal usticeresearch. Synthesi ing this material, a elon makes a strong case that thenew wave of prosecutors, not legislators, governors, police, or udges,hold the key to change. 21 y anchoring her analysis in deeply-researchedcase studies, she fosters refreshingly precise thinking as opposed toslogans about what we should expect from prosecutors. a elon alsoprovides a helpful explanation for reformers’ prosecutorial focus. Shewrites: While it would be nice if lawmakers and the courts threwthemselves into fixing the criminal ustice system, in the meantime,elections for prosecutors represent a shortcut to addressing a lot ofdysfunction. 22 The key benefit of this approach is speed. W e can stop
https: www.nytimes.com 2018 10 25 us texas-district-attorney-race-mass-incarceration.html https: perma.cc Z24-C Y3 (so characteri ingrasner, Rollins, and Creu ot) Allison Young, he Facts on Pro ressive
Prosecutors, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 19, 2020),https: www.americanprogress.org issues criminal-ustice reports 2020 03 19 481939 progressive-prosecutors-reforming-criminal- ustice https: perma.cc 97L -C WP (so characteri ing Foxxand oudin) Tim Prudente, Baltimore State s Attorney Mosby Stands with
Pro ressive Prosecutors, Also Airs Dispute with Gov. Ho an at St. Louis Rally,ALT. S N ( an. 15, 2020), https: www.baltimoresun.com politics bs-md-ci--20200115-r6 3hfsllbh3vcdpx oaq36gqu-story.htmlhttps: perma.cc 9ST-SG4W (so characteri ing Mosby).19. AZELON, supra note 11, at 290.20. See Erik Luna Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Jud es, 67 WASH. LEE L. REV.1413, 1417 (2010) (describing academic solutions to the problems ofprosecutorial discretion as taking two forms: the promulgation of internaloffice guidelines to control prosecutorial decision-making and thedevelopment of external limitations through restrictive legislation orheightened udicial review ).21. AZELON, supra note 11, at xxvii.22. d. at xxxi.
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caging people needlessly ri ht now if we choose prosecutors who will openthe locks. 23For those versed in the frustrating politics of criminal ustice reform,a elon’s message holds great appeal. Char ed’s primary weakness is itstendency, like the progressive prosecution movement it describes, topreach to the converted. Char ed and the prosecutor-driven reformmovement target the like-minded, i.e., political progressives, a minorityof the American population.24 Yet the new vision of prosecutors thatemerges from a elon’s narrative has the potential to appeal to a broaderconstituency.To achieve more mainstream appeal, both among academic theoristsand non-progressive voters, the prosecutor-driven-reform movementmust overcome two ob ections. The first ob ection points to an apparentinternal inconsistency in Char ed and the movement it chronicles. Char edsimultaneously laments the accumulation of prosecutorial power whilecelebrating the use of that power to achieve progressive policies. This maylook to critics like an uncomfortable in ection of politics into DistrictAttorney’s Offices.25 Commentators often oppose presidential power, forexample, right up until a presidential election. nchecked executive poweris good for my President, not yours. If this is all that is going on, then theinspirational rhetoric of progressive prosecution masks a mundaneeffort to draft local prosecutors into the familiar partisan power strugglesthat afflict the rest of government.26 A second, related ob ection is that aneven more prosecutor-dominated future eopardi es the system’sseparation of powers, further weakening its checks and balances. Criticsargue that progressive prosecutors exceed their traditional law-enforcement function: prosecutors are not supposed to counteract
23. d.24. a elon relates a concern expressed by a Republican District Attorney fromWisconsin, that the national reform movement seemed like a liberals-onlycause. d. at 155. See also Lydia Saad, Conservative Lead in .S. deolo y s
Down to Sin le Di its, GALL P ( an. 11, 2018), https: news.gallup.com poll225074 conservative-lead-ideology-down-single-digits.aspxhttps: perma.cc W63 -2M6Y ( Thirty-five percent of .S. adults in 2017identified as conservative and 26 as liberal. ).25. Cf. David Alan Sklansky, he Chan in Political Landscape for Elected
Prosecutors, 14 OHIO ST. . CRIM. L. 647, 650 (2017) (highlighting the risk thatprosecutorial decision-making will become inappropriately politici ed ).26. For example, a elon praises the ability of local prosecutors to stand up toTrump and fight the Trump administration. AZELON, supra note 11, atxxviii, 92.
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legislative policy decisions or usurp udges and uries by unilaterallyredefining the punishment (if any) for statutory crimes.27 D istrictattorneys do not make laws. That is the ob of the Legislature. 28Against this tumultuous backdrop, this Essay has two goals. Mostobviously, I seek to spotlight a elon’s important new book the first todocument a powerful new feature of the American criminal usticelandscape. Next, I want to leverage a elon’s crisp framing of the issues toanswer these two powerful ob ections to prosecutor-driven criminalustice reform. As explained below, I think a clear principle answers bothob ections. This principle can filter progressive prosecution into a non-partisan formula, focusing on lenience (and checks and balances) ratherthan nominally progressive sensibilities. At the same time, this generally-applicable framework can help to reconcile the shifting landscape ofAmerican prosecution with traditional academic narratives of criminalustice.While I develop my answer to the ob ections to prosecutor-drivenreform in the body of this Essay, I can sketch the contours here in theIntroduction. The answer begins with a clearer conception of the Americanprosecutor’s role, and prosecutorial power generally. Despite itspopularity, the prosecutor-king narrative pioneered by Stunt and
27. See, e. ., onathan Edwards, orfolk Prosecutor Can t Dismiss All Mari uana
Cases, ir inia Supreme Court Says, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (May 3, 2019),https: pilotonline.com news local crime article d260c5ce-6d3f-11e9-96bb-0364d44e54da.html https: perma.cc 66L7-ML N (noting that bothsides believed the other side was violating the state constitution’s divisionof powers ) Tom ackman, n Some Bi Cities, Reform Minded Prosecutors
and Police Chiefs Have Been At dds, WASH. POST ( uly 17, 2019),https: www.washingtonpost.com crime-law 2019 07 17 prosecutors-launch-reforms-police-chiefs-convene-national-summit-dc-with-district-attorney-counterparts https: perma.cc RR3-7 PN (quoting D.C. PoliceChief’s criticism: police and prosecutors take an oath to enforce the lawsand should not unilaterally decide they can decline to prosecute certaincrimes ) Alicia Victoria Lo ano Lauren Mayk, .S. Attorney McSwain,
Philadelphia District Attorney Krasner Clash Despite Shared ision for Safer
City, N C PHILA. ( une 20, 2019), https: www.nbcphiladelphia.com newslocal S-Attorney-William-McSwain-Philadelphia-District-Attorney-Larry-rasner-Clash-Despite-Shared-Vision-for-Safer-City-511582102.htmlhttps: perma.cc 7DEP-7DWT (offering similar criticism).28. Michael D. O’ eefe, he rue Role of he District Attorney, OS. GLO E (May28, 2019), https: www.bostonglobe.com opinion 2019 05 28 the-true-role-district-attorney VW CgWHw2rI8mYOom YpyN story.htmlhttps: perma.cc E632- E7C .
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animating Char ed is hyperbolic. Prosecutors are not unilaterally dolingout America’s criminal ustice outcomes. Contrary to the prominent voicesquoted throughout Char ed29 and in the academic literature,30 massincarceration did not arise because increasingly aggressive prosecutorssei ed too much power from hapless legislators and udges.31 Rather, thephenomenon came about through a slow-developing consensus amongthose, including prosecutors, who were supposed to check the State spower to punish.32 Legislators, udges, police, governors, voters, etc., arenot shocked, shocked’ at the outputs of the American criminal usticesystem. 33 Mass incarceration arose when all of these important actorsumped on the same tough-on-crime bandwagon.34 As Americanincarceration rates reached unprecedented heights, traditional checks onthe ability of any one actor (such as a prosecutor) to impose punishmentremained in place. They ust were not exercised as often.35A consensus, rather than prosecutor-centered explanation, forAmerican punitiveness shines a clarifying light on the role of the Americanprosecutor and the available pathways for prosecutor-driven reform.Progressive prosecutors are not well positioned to reverse massincarceration because of their breathtaking power relative to otheractors36 or because prosecutors are the criminal ustice system. 37Prosecutors can reduce the criminal ustice system’s severity because it
29. AZELON, supra note 11, at xxv-xxvi ( unfettered power of prosecutors )132-133 (citing to ohn Pfaff), 338 (citing to Angela Davis), 360-361 (citingto ed Rakoff and William Stunt ).30. See ellin, Reassessin Prosecutorial Power, supra note 16, at 854(summari ing academic trends).31. d.32. See effrey ellin, he Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y. . L. REV. 171, 200 (2019)hereinafter ellin, he Power of Prosecutors .33. d.34. See EREMY TRAVIS ET AL. EDS., NAT’L RESEARCH CO NCIL, THE GROWTH OFINCARCERATION IN THE NITED STATES: E PLORING CA SES AND CONSE ENCES 70( eremy Travis et al. eds., 2014).35. d. ellin, he Power of Prosecutors, supra note 32, at 200.36. AZELON, supra note 11, at xxv.37. Luna Wade, supra note 10, at 1285.
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takes a village to incarcerate, 38 and any dissenting actor in the chain canshort-circuit the State’s power to punish.Cutting through the illusion of prosecutor dominance reveals animportant, if nuanced, distinction between the two opposing dimensions ofthe prosecutorial function. Sometimes prosecutors seek to punish. To doso, they require consensus. This is where checks and balances andseparation of powers play a critical role. Prosecutors react to decisions bylegislators who define offenses and authori e punishments, and policewho investigate and arrest. Prosecutors then work to obtain the approvalof uries and udges to impose legislatively-authori ed (or mandated)punishments. Parole boards, udges, and governors ad ust sentences onthe back end, after conviction. Through it all, great power is exercised. utit is an expression of the State’s power, not the prosecutor’s power. Whenit comes to imposing punishment, prosecutorial power is contingent onother actors. This inability to inflict punishment unilaterally is the essenceof our system’s checks and balances and the proper focus for concernsabout their erosion.Prosecutors also exercise a power of lenience. In this role, prosecutorsare themselves acting as a check on the State’s power to punish. ust likeother powerful criminal ustice actors, such as police, prosecutors are
supposed to act unilaterally to dispense lenience. No consensus is required.(Think of the police officer who gives a speeding motorist a warning ratherthan a ticket.) In this context, prosecutorial power may well counteract thewill of other actors. A prosecutor who announces that she will no longerenforce mari uana laws frustrates a legislature that recently rebuffedefforts to repeal those laws. Yet this is not a repudiation of checks andbalances or a violation of separation of powers. The prosecutor’s actionillustrates these concepts in action the prosecutor is acting as a check onthe State’s power to punish. Importantly, prosecutorial lenience is itselfsub ect to restraint through political accountability. In almost every State,chief prosecutors are elected.39 While American voters have traditionally
38. ellin, Reassessin Prosecutorial Power, supra note 16, at 837 see also ellin,
he Power of Prosecutors, supra note 32, at 181 ( The track is laid bylegislators and passes through critical gateways controlled by police, udges,and other actors. A ourney on that track begins when the police arrest aperson and deliver the case to the prosecutor for a charging decision. ut nopunishment may be imposed until a ury convicts or the defendant agrees,with udicial approval, to plead guilty. And even then, a udge (or legislature)selects the punishment. ).39. Angela . Davis, he American Prosecutor ndependence, Power, and the
hreat of yranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 451 (2001) ( O nly the District of
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shown little interest in reining in officials who act too punitively, voterscan and do counteract unpopular leniency at the ballot box.40This twofold conceptuali ation of prosecutorial power offers the rawmaterial for fashioning a neutral principle that can animate prosecutor-driven criminal ustice reform and expand the movement’s appeal. yfocusing on the prosecutor’s structural role as a check on the State’s powerto punish, reformers avoid the corrosive partisanship that mars themodern political landscape. Importantly, this framing of the DistrictAttorney as a check on government overreach can radiate beyondprogressive strongholds to moderate and conservative urisdictions sorelyin need of prosecutor-driven reform.41Reform-minded prosecutors animated by a principle of lenience wouldwork to broadly ratchet down, not redistribute, the system’s severity. As aresult, a more robust prosecutorial role would not exacerbate worriesabout the accumulation of prosecutorial power or the erosion of thesystem’s separation of powers. A new wave of aggressively lenientprosecutors would be performing, not repudiating, the American ideal ofchecks and balances.I. TWO FACES OF PROSEC TORIAL POWER
Char ed anchors its discussion in two case studies. a elon explains:These two stories illustrate the damage prosecutors can do and also theprecious second chances they can extend that allow people to make thingsright in their own lives. 42 As discussed below, the stories also highlightdistinct dimensions of prosecutorial power. The first story invites analysisof prosecutorial decision-making in the face of policy disagreement,specifically disagreement between a prosecutor and the New YorkLegislature about the proper punishment for unlawfully carrying a loadedgun. This is where progressive prosecution can contribute mostmeaningfully to the American criminal ustice landscape, offering theprospect of leniency to those guilty of statutory crimes. The second storyexplores prosecutors’ power to punish, a power wielded improperly, ina elon’s view, in a Tennessee murder prosecution. As I will explain, theTennessee story, while important, offers little direct support for
Columbia and four states Delaware, New ersey, Rhode Island, andConnecticut maintain a system of appointed prosecutors. ).40. See infra text accompanying notes 149-153.41. See ellin, heories of Prosecution, supra note 17, at 1250-51.42. AZELON, supra note 11, at xxix.
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progressive prosecution or transformative prosecutorial power. Instead,this story illustrates generally-applicable dangers of prosecutorial excessand the importance of existing checks against government overreach.
A. KevinThe first case study focuses on the prosecutor’s power to decline topursue a case against a defendant who, after committing a criminaloffense, faces severe penal consequences. This is the power of lenience,which I describe elsewhere as the unreviewable ability to (discretely)open exits from an otherwise inflexible system. 43 This story, andthousands like it, lie at the core of the potential for prosecutor-drivencriminal ustice reform. The story is evin’s.evin, a pseudonym, is a twenty-year-old resident of the rownsvilleneighborhood in rooklyn.44 As evin tells it, one night, he is hanging outwith friends in an apartment. A loaded handgun sits on a table near thefront door. As one friend leaves the apartment, police appear outside as ifthey were about to knock. 45 Seeing the gun inside, the police burst inthrough the open door. 46 evin grabs the gun and takes off running. Theofficers quickly apprehend him. An officer asks the group whose gun itwas. evin explains, I had the gun on me, so it was only right to say it wasmine. 47a elon’s narrative shifts to a rooklyn court where, if you knew howto look for it, the proceedings offered a display of enormousprosecutorial power. 48 She explains: The prosecutors held power in therooklyn gun court, and evin had entered the system at a moment inwhich that was more true, in courts across the country, than everbefore. 49
43. ellin, Reassessin Prosecutorial Power, supra note 16, at 835.44. AZELON, supra note 11, at xiii.45. d. at xix.46. d. at xx (describing police entry), 23 (describing police observing the gun).47. d. at xxi. a elon explains evin’s actions as taking the gun charge for hisfriend, Chris. d. at 33. Notably, the friend’s possession of the firearm wouldhave been a less serious offense. N.Y. PENAL LAW 265.03(3) ( Suchpossession shall not . . . constitute a violation of this subdivision if suchpossession takes place in such person’s home. ).48. AZELON, supra note 11, at xxiii.49. d. at xxv.
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Anyone familiar with the academic literature will recogni e thisconceptuali ation of prosecutor power.50 They may also know that I amnot a fan.51 I critique this common framing in another piece because:It removes the legislature from the equation by framing thecriminal ustice system as a discrete, unchangeable set ofpathways. It overlooks the role of police by spontaneously placingthe defendant on the track awaiting the decision of the powerfulprosecutor. And it discounts the influence of udges, parole andprobation officers, and governors.52a elon’s case study provides an opportunity to clarify mydisagreement with this framing of prosecutorial power and (helpfully, Ihope) distinguish between two kinds of power, one that the prosecutorcan exercise unilaterally and another that the prosecutor cannot. Theprosecutor’s power to punish evin derives from actions already taken bythe legislature and police. Going forward, the prosecutor’s power to punishwill be contingent on what uries and udges do in this or similar cases.Yes, the prosecutor can send evin to prison but only if a chorus of otherpowerful criminal ustice actors concur.The prosecutor does have a power that can be exercised unilaterally. Itis not the power to punish. It is the power to let evin go. Like the policeofficer who could have declined to arrest evin,53 the legislatures of manystates that do not criminali e gun possession,54 or the Supreme Court,coincidentally on the verge of declaring a constitutional right to carry agun,55 the prosecutor can let evin off the legal hook. This power isespecially meaningful here because the criminal case against evin is openand shut. The famous aphorism about legal strategy comes to mind: If thefacts are against you, argue the law. If the law is against you, argue the
50. ellin, he Power of Prosecutors, supra note 32, at 200 (highlighting this typeof framing as epitomi ing the genre of academic commentary).51. d.52. d.53. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 4 CRIMINAL PROCED RE 13.2(b) (4th ed. 2017)( D iscretion is regularly exercised by the police in deciding when toarrest. ).54. See effrey ellin, he Ri ht to Remain Armed, 93 WASH. . L. REV. 1, 17-19(2015) (chronicling state gun law landscape).55. d. at 18-21 (chronicling likely tra ectory of Supreme Court SecondAmendment rulings).
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facts. If the law and the facts are against you, pound the table and yell likehell. 56evin’s attorney, and a elon, who is openly in evin’s corner, are inpound the table mode.Start with the facts. Even in evin’s own recounting, he is guilty ofpossessing a loaded firearm.57 The police caught him red-handed.The law is even worse for evin. Well before his arrest, New Yorkenacted a strict set of statutes criminali ing unlicensed gun possession,with a goal of suppressing gun violence. evin himself recogni es thepublic policy dilemma that faced the legislature. As a elon explains: Theyear evin was twelve, more than a hundred people were shot in andaround rownsville and another thirty were killed . . . . Guns were a fact oflife. I could find someone with a gun before I could find someone with adiploma,’ evin told me.’ 58It is helpful to a candid discussion of the prosecutor’s role that evin’soffense is a non-trivial gun crime a type of law that many progressivessupport. a elon’s view of guns is fatalistic: The guns could be no morecontrolled, in the end, than the damage they did could be contained. 59 Yetlater in the book, a elon notes the ama ing transformation of New YorkCity and rownsville. rownsville had once been as violent as any crime-ridden city in the developing world. Now it was safer than the wealthyparts of New York were a generation ago. 60 The damage that guns used todo in New York City has been contained.61 Maybe they are wrong, but New
56. GoodReads, Carl Sandbur uotes, https: www.goodreads.com quotes918291-if-the-facts-are-against-you-argue-the-law-ifhttps: perma.cc MT4S-P2DM .57. See People v. Minervini, 22 Misc. 3d 1112(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009) ( T oconvict the defendant of that crime, the People would be required to provehe unlawfully possessed a loaded and operable firearm, and that suchpossession did not take place in his home or place of business.’ ).58. AZELON, supra note 11, at xiv-xv.59. d. at xviii.60. d. at 199.61. See effrey ellin, he nverse Relationship Between the Constitutionality and
Effectiveness of ew York City Stop and Frisk , 94 . . L. REV. 1495, 1520(2014) ( etween 1990 and 2012, while the City’s population grew byalmost a million people, the number of homicides dropped from 2,245 to419. ) (citing FRAN LIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT ECAME SAFE: NEW YOR ’SLESSONS FOR R AN CRIME AND ITS CONTROL 4 (2011).
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York’s politicians (including progressives) claim that the strictenforcement of gun laws deserve some of the credit.62A key component of New York’s gun suppression efforts are fourhandgun possession offenses, each titled criminal possession of aweapon (CPW) and distinguished by degrees. a elon characteri es thefour CPW offenses as a menu of options of varying severity, from whichthe prosecutor selects according to taste.63 The prosecutor’s role inselecting a charge, a elon suggests, is to get it right by determining,How dangerous was evin What punishment did he deserve, and whatconsequence for him would serve the community’s interests 64At least on its face, the charging dynamic is more static. New York’slegislature does not really frame its gun laws as a menu. Each offenseapplies to a different factual scenario:• CPW (First Degree): a person possesses ten or more firearms 65• CPW (Second Degree): a person possesses any loaded firearm 66• CPW (Third Degree): (i) the person has a prior criminal conviction 67or (ii) the firearm has been defaced for the purpose of concealment orprevention of the detection of a crime 68 and• CPW (Fourth Degree) (misdemeanor): a person possesses anyfirearm . . . . 69
62. See, e. ., Press Release, New York City, Mayor Bill de Blasio Joins Mayors
A ainst lle al Guns ( an. 30, 2014), https: www1.nyc.gov office-of-the-mayor news 725-14 mayor-bill-de-blasio- oins-mayors-against-illegal-guns (quoting mayor urging vigorous enforcement of gun laws) GeorgePataki, Frisks Save Lives, N.Y. POST, ( uly 11, 2012),https: nypost.com 2012 07 11 frisks-save-lives (writing, as a formerNew York Governor, that establishing mandatory minimum sentences forillegal gun possession made the city and state safer ) see infra textaccompanying notes 86-89.63. The law that governed here gave the D.A.’s office an array of options.AZELON, supra note 11, at xxiii, 134.64. d. at xxiii.65. N.Y. PENAL LAW 265.04.66. d. 265 (class C (violent) felony) 70.02(3)(b) (providing for a mandatory3.5-year sentence).67. a elon relates evin’s two previous run-ins with the law, but since bothcases appear to have been resolved without a conviction, this charge likelydid not apply. AZELON, supra note 11, at xvi, xvii.68. N.Y. PENAL LAW 265.02 (class D (violent) felony) 70.02(3)(c) (providing amandatory two-year sentence).
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Given this framework, it is unsurprising that rooklyn’s progressiveprosecutors ultimately charge evin with CPW (Second Degree). Thecharge does not reflect the prosecutor’s perception of evin’sdangerousness or the community’s interest. It reflects the fact that thefirearm evin possessed was loaded.In any event, any disagreement about charging is quickly subsumed bythe realities of American criminal ustice. As in many cases, evin’s initialcharge is the beginning, not the end, of the process. Due to America’stendency to criminali e frequently-engaged-in behavior and vigorouslypolice violations, this country’s courts are overwhelmed.70 This means thatprosecutors face strong pressure to bargain for admissions of guilt.pwards of ninety-five percent of criminal convictions result from guiltypleas.71 The CPW (Second Degree) charge is an initial offer a signal ofwhat the prosecution believes its evidence will prove at trial. If evin iswilling to plead guilty, preserving court resources and foregoing thepotential for an acquittal, the prosecutor will reduce the charge or offerother concessions.In evin’s case, each side feels pressure to bargain. For the prosecutor,there is a significant likelihood of a loss at trial. a elon reports that as thecase progresses through the New York courts: (1) the udge assigned toevin’s case excludes his statement to police that the gun was his and (2)a government test on material found on the gun grip fails to turn upevin’s DNA.72 These are important developments, not because theysuggest evin is innocent. We know from evin’s own account that hecommitted the charged offense. Rather, they increase the chances that aury will acquit. Litigants bargain in the shadow of trial. 73 For the
69. N.Y. PENAL LAW 265.01.70. See ISSA OHLER-HA SMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL CO RTS AND SOCIALCONTROL IN AN AGE OF RO EN WINDOWS POLICING (2018) (chronicling thedysfunction of New York courts) Adam M. Gershowit Laura R. illinger,
he State ever Rests How E cessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal
Defendants, 105 NW. . L. REV. 261, 278 (2011) (documenting enormous stateprosecutor caseloads and resulting problems).71. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 .S. 134, 143 (2012) ( Ninety-seven percent offederal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are theresult of guilty pleas. ).72. AZELON, supra note 11, at 122-23.73. ellin, he Power of Prosecutors, supra note 32, at 210 ( udges andlegislatures indirectly dictate the terms of prosecutors’ plea offers by settingthe backdrop against which defendants assess those offers. ) ellin,
Reassessin Prosecutorial Power, supra note 16, at 850 ( Studies suggest that
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prosecutor, the shadow of a rooklyn ury trial has begun to lookominous.74The shadow of trial doesn’t look so great for evin either. He has a realchance at an acquittal but, if evin loses at trial, the mandatory sentencethat attaches to the CPW (Second Degree) offense means that even asympathetic udge cannot keep him out of prison.75 Of course, evin haslittle incentive to plead guilty to the char ed offense. If he is going to beconvicted of carrying a loaded firearm, he might as well take his chances attrial. The obvious middle ground involves a guilty plea to the misdemeanor(unloaded) firearm offense, a crime that does not include any mandatorysentence but would result in a criminal record and udicially-selectedsentence.a elon would like prosecutors to look beyond the shadow of trial toloftier considerations. She highlights the needs of the community, thethreat (if any) posed by evin’s conduct and, ultimately, ustice.76 In lightof the severe sentence that attaches to the offense, a elon believes thatprosecuting evin for CPW (Second Degree) is un ust. That makes sense. Itis important to acknowledge, however, the import of this position. a elonand those who champion progressive prosecution are not ust askingprosecutors to reform their own excesses (that’s the theme of a elon’ssecond case study, which we will get to below). evin’s CPW (SecondDegree) charge is not an example of overcharging it is the charge thatprecisely fits the provable facts.77 If CPW (Second Degree) is the wrongcharge, as a elon contends, then we are asking prosecutors toundercharge. Specifically, we are asking prosecutors to reverse a specificpolicy choice made by the legislature and supported by other importantcriminal ustice actors, such as police.78 This dynamic lies at the core of theprogressive prosecution movement. It is the same dynamic in play whenprogressive prosecutors announce that they will not prosecute offenses
plea deals across a large number of cases reflect a predictable discount fromgenerally agreed-upon, likely trial outcomes. ).74. See David N. Dorfman Chris . Ii ima, Fictions, Fault, and For iveness Jury
ullification in a ew Conte t, 28 . MICH. .L. REFORM 861, 886-87 (1995)(reporting high acquittal rates for rooklyn gun possession cases).75. See supra note 66.76. AZELON, supra note 11, at xxiii.77. ellin, heories of Prosecution, supra note 17, at 1224-25 (discussing the ill-defined concept of overcharging ).78. See infra text at notes 86-90.
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viewed as un ust, like mari uana possession or shoplifting,79 or that triggerunduly harsh punishments.ltimately, rooklyn’s prosecutors agree to place evin’s case in adiversion program called Youth and Congregations in Partnership(YCP).80 If evin completes a program consisting of drug testing, curfews,and weekly trips to a social worker, the prosecutor will dismiss the caseafter a year.81 a elon reports that the burdensome conditions are actuallya relief to evin because now his friends and the neighborhood couldsee that he hadn’t gotten off scot-free, that he wasn’t a snitch. 82After the udge assigned to evin’s case refuses to sign off on theagreement, viewing it as too lenient, the parties take the case to anotherudge. evin completes the year, plus eighty hours of community service.The prosecution dismisses the case and evin’s record is cleared.83a elon notes that this is the third time that criminal charges againstevin were resolved through a diversion program.84In a elon’s view, this is what ustice looks like because evin is notdangerous. The community did not need to place him behind bars. Manywould agree,85 but not everyone. This is what makes evin’s case soimportant. Assuming that rooklyn’s prosecutors offered evin diversionbecause they disagree with New York’s strict gun laws, the case illustratesan increasingly prominent feature of the prosecutorial landscape.
79. AZELON, supra note 11, at 156 (describing the priorities of the participantsin a Fair and ust Prosecution convening). Fair and ust Prosecution, asexplained by its executive director, is a supportive network and conciergeservice for D.A.s with aspirations for reform. d. at 152.80. d. at xxiv, 30.81. d. at 30.82. d. at 145.83. d. at 248-49.84. d. at xvi, xvii. a elon’s description of the first instance when, at age 16,evin got five hundred hours of community service, is vague but seemsconsistent with diversion since it references a charge but no ad udication. d.at xvi.85. See, e. ., Paul utler, Prosecutors Role in Causin and Solvin the
Problem of Mass ncarceration, WASH. POST (Apr. 19, 2019) (reviewing EMILYAZELON, CHARGED), https: www.washingtonpost.com outlook prosecutors-role-in-causing--and-solving--the-problem-of-mass-incarceration 2019 04 19 d370d844-5c93-11e9-a00e-050dc7b82693 story.html https: perma.cc 2E 8- A68 .
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The prosecutor’s actions in evin’s case frustrate the preferences of ahost of other criminal ustice actors. a elon notes that even New YorkCity progressives favor strict application of the gun laws. Mayor ill delasio spearheaded the rooklyn gun court where evin’s case is heard tospeed up and strengthen the prosecution of gun possession cases in NewYork. 86 In 2006, New York’s legislature eliminated a provision that gaveudges the option of not imposing ail time on people found guilty ofillegally possessing a loaded firearm. 87 The New York City PoliceDepartment (NYPD) similarly urged ero tolerance for gun offenders andwanted to shut YCP down. 88 Offering an uncertain coda to a elon’sreporting, a recent NYPD press release claiming to be responding to anincrease in homicides centered in rooklyn touts its partnership with theDistrict Attorney’s office to work collaboratively to ensure that those whoillegally carry . . . firearms will be prosecuted to the full extent of thelaw. 89The tension depicted above provides a fertile factual context to reflecton a elon’s theme: the benefits of prosecutorial power. The rooklynprosecutors exercised the power of lenience to achieve an outcome at oddswith the wishes of the Mayor, police, legislature, and the assigned udge.90This is where a elon, who throughout the book rails against thebreathtaking power of American prosecutors,91 seems inconsistent.
86. AZELON, supra note 11, at 53. a elon notes that de lasio’s endorsementderived from searching for an alternative to New York’s previous gunpolicing strategy: stop-and-frisk. d. at 65.87. Michael S. Schmidt, Main hreat to Burress s a Sentencin Law, N.Y. TIMES(Dec. 2, 2008), https: www.nytimes.com 2008 12 03 sports football 03weapon.html https: perma.cc L9EG- WR .88. AZELON, supra note 11, at 31.89. Press Release, New York Police Department, Citywide Overall CrimeContinues to Decline in February 2019 (Mar. 4, 2019),https: www1.nyc.gov site nypd news pr0304 citywide-overall-crime-continues-decline-february-2019 0 https: perma.cc 62 6-G PC .90. See ellin, he Power of Prosecutors, supra note 32, at 176 (defining power inthis context as the prosecutor’s ability to achieve a goal when other actors(legislators, udges, police) resist ) cf. ulie Shaw, nder DA Krasner, More
Gun Possession Cases Get Court Diversionary Pro ram, PHILA. IN IRER ( une23, 2019), https: www.inquirer.com news philadelphia-district-attorney-larry-krasner-gun-possession-cases-diverted-ard-probationary-program-20190623.html https: perma.cc 789-TG (describing similar diversionof gun cases in Philadelphia under Larry rasner).91. AZELON, supra note 11, at xxv.
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Readers, particularly those outside the progressive fold, will be left longingfor a theory to reconcile the apparent inconsistency. If this is about morethan ust politics (my-powerful-prosecutors-are-good-your-powerful-prosecutors-are-bad), we need a principle to distinguish constructive fromworrisome exercises of prosecutorial power. ut first, let’s considera elon’s second case study.
B. oura JacksonNoura ackson’s story starts on a horrific day in une 2005 when hermother, a thirty-nine-year-old investment banker, is stabbed to death.92ackson discovers the body in a bedroom and calls 911. Finding no signs offorced entry, police suspect ackson of the crime.93 Although the case isentirely circumstantial, 94 the police arrest ackson and a grand uryindicts her for first-degree murder.95Trial goes badly for everyone. ackson does not testify in her owndefense.96 In fact, her attorney calls no witnesses.97 The assignedprosecutor, Amy Weirich, violates ackson’s Fifth Amendment rights
92. d. at 3-4 see also Emily a elon, She Was Convicted of Killin Her Mother.
Prosecutors Withheld the Evidence hat Would Have Freed Her, N.Y. TIMESMAG. (Aug. 1, 2017), https: www.nytimes.com 2017 08 01 maga ine she-was-convicted-of-killing-her-mother-prosecutors-withheld-the-evidence-that-would-have-freed-her.html https: perma.cc H2G4- WTL .93. See Glenn Ruppel Alexa Valiente, How A Woman Won Her Release from
Prison Years After Bein Convicted of Her Mother s Murder, A C NEWS (Mar.23, 2017), https: abcnews.go.com S woman-won-release-prison-years-convicted-mothers-murder story id 46313117 https: perma.cc ME3E-ZZC5 . See also State v. ackson, No. W2009-01709-CCA-R3CD, 2012 WL6115084, at 5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 10, 2012) (quoting testimony thatwhile the window in a kitchen door leading to the garage was broken,there was no forced point of entry at the residence, and the doors andwindows were locked. ).94. AZELON, supra note 11, at 15.95. See State v. ackson, No. W2009-01709-CCA-R3CD, 2012 WL 6115084, at 3(Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 10, 2012) (noting indictment).96. a elon reports the conventional wisdom that putting ackson on thestand was a big gamble. AZELON, supra note 11, at 115. Declining to testifywas also a gamble. See effrey ellin, he Silence Penalty, 103 IOWA L. REV. 395(2018).97. AZELON, supra note 11, at 115.
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during closing argument, theatrically exclaiming in front of the ury, usttell us where you were. 98 The prosecution team fails to turn over evidencethat would have impeached a prosecution witness99 until shortly after thetrial.100After nine hours of deliberation, the ury finds ackson guilty ofsecond-degree murder.101 The udge sentences her to nearly twenty-oneyears in prison.102 The tide turns when the Tennessee Supreme Courtreverses ackson’s conviction due to the prosecutors’ misconduct.103Rather than risk a new trial, ackson accepts a plea deal that requires herto serve another year and three months in prison.104 In all, ackson spendsover a decade behind bars.105ackson’s case presents the most basic dilemma facing the criminalustice system and its prosecutors: factual uncertainty. ackson’s trial tooktwo weeks the prosecution called forty-five witnesses, and three hundredand seventy-six exhibits were introduced. 106 a elon argues compellinglythat ackson is innocent.107 Not everyone agrees. Asked years later, DistrictAttorney Weinrich remained absolutely certain of Noura’s guilt. 108Prosecutors brought in after the appellate reversal from another officesimilarly refused to dismiss the case.109 The ury that convicted ackson
98. See Griffin v. California, 380 .S. 609, 615 (1965) (holding that theConstitution forbids . . . comment by the prosecution on the accused’ssilence ).99. See Giglio v. nited States, 405 .S. 150, 155 (1972) (holding thatprosecutors must disclose material impeachment evidence).100. AZELON, supra note 11, at 119-21.101. d. at 119.102. d. at 121.103. d. at 185.104. d. at 236.105. See Ruppel Valiente, supra note 93 (detailing the time ackson spentincarcerated).106. State v. ackson, 444 S.W.3d 554, 560 (Tenn. 2014).107. AZELON, supra note 11, at 15-16.108. d. at 16 see also Ruppel Valiente, supra note 93.109. See April Thompson, Witnesses in oura Jackson s Case Refused to estify in
ew rial, NEWS CHANNEL 3 WREG MEMPHIS (May 20, 2015),https: wreg.com 2015 05 20 witnesses-in-noura- acksons-case-refused-to-testify-in-new-trial https: perma.cc A6SF-GGE9 (reporting that the
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW 39 : 218 2020
238
thought her guilty (although without seeing all the evidence). The trialudge did too, explaining after trial: I think Noura ackson had a very fairtrial, and she was obviously guilty. 110 The appellate udges who reviewedthe case found the evidence sufficient to support the conviction, anadmittedly low standard, but one designed to screen out the weakestcases.111 One of those udges wrote that the proof of guilt although notoverwhelming, is relatively strong. 112The media loves cases with factual uncertainty and so does the public.Americans can experience Robert Durst (perhaps) get away with murderin H O’s documentary, he Jin 113 Steven Avery and rendan Dassey(possibly) wrongfully imprisoned in Netflix’s Makin a Murderer 114 andAdnan Syed’s (possible) wrongful conviction in the podcast Serial.115Various iterations of the (is-it-a-)true-crime phenomenon populate theairwaves every night.116 ackson’s case could easily oin this genre.a elon is right that when it comes to cases of factual uncertainty,prosecutors need guidance. It is remarkable how little thought has beengiven to the precise standard for prosecution in this context.117 In a recentarticle, I suggest the following standard: A prosecutor should only
new prosecutors insisted that they got what they wanted with the pleadeal).110. Ruppel Valiente, supra note 93.111. See Jackson, 444 S.W.3d at 592 ( T he evidence of guilt in this case wasentirely circumstantial and, while sufficient to support the conviction, cannotbe described as overwhelming. ) State v. ackson, No. W2009-01709-CCA-R3CD, 2012 WL 6115084, at 64 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012) ( T he evidence issufficient to support the defendant’s conviction. ).112. Jackson, 2012WL 6115084, at 67.113. he Jin (H O 2015), https: www.hbo.com the- inx-the-life-and-deaths-of-robert-durst https: perma.cc Y R2-H5 .114. Makin a Murderer (Netflix 2015), https: www.netflix.com title 80000770https: perma.cc 5L2-WF7M .115. Serial Season ne, THIS AMERICAN LIFE (2014),https: serialpodcast.org season-one https: perma.cc EE3 -RA R .116. See, e. ., ill Carter, A Prime ime rue Crime Spree, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19,2011), https: www.nytimes.com 2011 08 21 arts television true-crime-tv-on-shows-like-dateline.html https: perma.cc S5WA-H6PL (chroniclingtelevision shows).117. See ellin, heories of Prosecution, supra note 17, at 1221 (critici ing the lackof concrete ethics guidance for prosecutors).
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charge a case when the prosecutor expects that the evidence introduced attrial will prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 118 ut asackson’s case illustrates, the standard is ust a starting point. People willinevitably disagree about its application. If a elon were the prosecutor,she would apply the standard to dismiss the case against ackson. Weirichreached the opposite conclusion.To explain the disagreement, a elon suggests that Weirich is a badprosecutor, suffering from tunnel vision and an office culture thatplaced winning above other values. 119 ut, as a elon notes, Weirichtalks about prosecutors the same way a elon does. In a column about theprosecutorial role, Weirich writes: As I tell our new assistant districtattorneys at orientation, our ob is to do the right thing every day for theright reason. That might mean dismissing a difficult case because the proofis simply not there . . . . M y ob is to see that ustice is done. 120Weirich and a elon appear to agree on the principle: ustice. Theydisagree about what ustice looks like in the ackson case. This kind ofdisagreement is probably inevitable. It is not something that we canrealistically expect progressive prosecutors to resolve. In fact, an emphasison achieving ustice, a progressive tenet, may fuel the dangers ofprosecutorial excess by subtly undercutting adherence to legal rules (liketransparency requirements) in favor of loftier goals.121Fortunately, there is another remedy for prosecutorial overreach:checks and balances. The criminal ustice system expects prosecutors tobring bad cases. There are over 25,000 prosecutors and an almost infinitevariety of cases.122 There will always be prosecutors who get it wrong.That’s why prosecutors cannot punish unilaterally.
118. d. at 1223.119. AZELON, supra note 11, at 16-19.120. Amy Weirich, Opinion, he Chan in Role of the District Attorney, DAILYMEMPHIAN (Dec. 07, 2018), https: dailymemphian.com article 1622 The-changing-role-of-the-district-attorney https: perma.cc DV6Z-TTTH .121. See ellin, heories of Prosecution, supra note 17, at 1216-20 (highlightingdangers of the amorphous do ustice command).122. d. at 1210 n.44 (citing Steve W. Perry Duren anks, Prosecutors in StateCourts, 2007 - Statistical Tables, REA OF ST. STAT. 2 (DEC. 2011),https: www.b s.gov content pub pdf psc07st.pdfhttps: perma.cc 6GNZ-4RR ( The nearly 25,000 FTE assistantprosecutors employed in 2007 represented a 7 increase from the numberreported in 2001. . . . ).
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The first check is legislators who need to understand that human erroris an inevitable component of criminal prosecution. When it comes tocriminal law, less is more.The next check on the State’s power to punish comes in the form of thesystem’s investigators. Police generate the evidence that points to guilt orinnocence. In most cases, prosecutors don’t get involved until the policeidentify a potential target of the State’s punitive powers and rule out (atleast in their mind) alternative culprits.123The next two checks consist of regular people. In many urisdictions, agrand ury determines whether there is probable cause to charge.124 Ifdisagreement persists, another ury decides, at trial, whether theprosecutor has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.125 Guilty verdictsmust be unanimous.126 Throughout the proceedings, defense attorneysplay a critical role in bringing out weaknesses in the prosecution’s case. Toensure that the prosecutor and police follow the rules, a neutral udgepresides. When the trial udge fails, there are appellate courts.These mechanisms were present in ackson’s case. A grand uryindicted her.127 A ury convicted her.128 The trial udge concurred.129 TheTennessee Supreme Court reviewed her case and reversed her conviction.
123. See ellin, he Power of Prosecutors, supra note 32, at 192 (detailing the roleof police).124. See .S. CONST. amend. V ( No person shall be held to answer for a capital, orotherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grandury . . . . ) Roger A. Fairfax, r., Grand Jury Discretion and Constitutional
Desi n, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 703, 707 n.5 (2008) ( A bout half of the fiftystates have some form of grand ury requirement. (citing SARA S N EALE ETAL., GRAND RY LAW AND PRACTICE 8.2 (2d ed. 2005)).125. See n re Winship, 397 .S. 358, 364 (1970) ( T he Due Process Clauseprotects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond areasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with whichhe is charged. ).126. See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1397 (2020).127. See State v. ackson, No. W2009-01709-CCA-R3CD, 2012 WL 6115084, at 3(Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 10, 2012) (noting indictment).128. AZELON, supra note 11, at 119.129. d. at 121 (denying a motion for a new trial). In Tennessee, a trial udge shallorder the entry of udgment of acquittal . . . if the evidence is insufficient tosustain a conviction. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 29(b).
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Tennessee’s parole board considered but denied ackson’s release.130Tennessee’s governor issued a number of pardons during the relevantperiod but did not grant one to ackson.131 Of course, a elon is right thatthe prosecutor too played an instrumental role. ut all of these actorsmattered. Everyone in the system is supposed to protect the factuallyinnocent. If ackson is innocent, her case reflects a cascade of failuresacross the system. It is unclear why, in this context, we should brush offthese failings to focus on Weirich (or analogous prosecutors across thecountry). Nor is it obvious that progressive prosecutors will be less likelyto push legal boundaries and overlook factual ambiguity in their ownealous pursuit of ustice.Compare ackson’s prosecution with another example of prosecutionin the face of factual uncertainty. In 2015, altimore’s State’s Attorney,progressive prosecutor Marilyn Mosby, prosecuted six police officersinvolved in the death of Freddie Gray.132 Announcing these charges, Mosbyleaped onto the national stage as heroine and lightning rod. 133 Likeackson’s case, however, the Freddie Gray prosecutions involved failuresto disclose evidence134 and a controversial effort to override the Fifth
130. See elsey Ott,Woman Accused of Killin Her Mother Will Stay in Prison, NEWSCHANNEL 3WREG MEMPHIS (Aug. 12, 2015),https: wreg.com 2015 08 12 woman-accused-of-killing-her-mother-to-stay-in-prison https: perma.cc H4P - 287 .131. Adam Tamburin, Gov. Bill Haslam Granted People Clemency, But He Has Yet
to Address Cyntoia Brown Case, TENNESSEAN (Dec. 20, 2018),https: www.tennessean.com story news crime 2018 12 20 cyntoia-brown-gov-bill-haslam-no-clemency-decision-tennessee 2378424002https: perma.cc 9 M9-48NE .132. See Wil S. Hylton, Baltimore vs. Marilyn Mosby, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 28,2016), https: www.nytimes.com 2016 10 02 maga ine marilyn-mosby-freddie-gray-baltimore.html https: perma.cc 4ZZ-GW A .133. Heidi Mitchell, Meet Marilyn Mosby he Baltimore Prosecutor in the Eye of
the Storm, VOG E ( uly 2015), https: www.vogue.com article marilyn-mosby-baltimore-prosecutor https: perma.cc AW47-E6 S .134. See Safia Samee Ali, rial of an Driver in Freddie Gray Case Reveals
Prosecutor iolations, N C NEWS ( une 23, 2016),https: www.nbcnews.com storyline baltimore-unrest trial-van-driver-freddie-gray-case-reveals-prosecutor-violations-n596731https: perma.cc 8Z5Y- 57 (detailing court rulings that prosecutorscommitted Brady violations).
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Amendment protections offered to criminal defendants.135Mosby’s decision to pursue the Freddie Gray prosecutionsencountered resistance. The prosecution tried the six officersseparately.136 The first case ended in a mistrial when the ury was unableto reach a verdict.137 The second and third trials ended with not guiltyverdicts.138 nable to obtain consensus from the necessary criminal usticeactors, Mosby could not impose punishment. She dismissed the remainingcharges.139Cases that move forward despite factual uncertainty do not illustratethe unbridled power of prosecutors. They bring out the multitude of actorswho must concur whenever the State imposes punishment.140 Focusing on
135. See ustin Fenton, Freddie Gray Case Maryland Hi h Court Says fficer Porter
Must estify A ainst All Five Co Defendants, ALT. S N (Mar. 8, 2016),https: www.baltimoresun.com news crime bs-md-ci-appeals-court-ruling-freddie-gray-20160308-story.html https: perma.cc 265P- ASL(quoting a law professor after the prosecution’s unusual success incompelling one co-defendant to testify against another, stating that theprecedent provides a new arrow in the quiver of prosecutors when theydeal with co-defendant cases’ I hope . . . that the kind of uniquecircumstances here makes this O in this instance, but . . . will not changehow co-defendant cases are typically tried.’ ).136. See Hylton, supra note 132 (chronicling cases).137. Sheryl Gay Stolberg ess idgood, Mistrial Declared in Case of fficer
Char ed in Freddie Gray s Death, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2015) (mistrial ofOfficer William G. Porter), https: www.nytimes.com 2015 1217 us freddie-gray-baltimore-police-trial.html https: perma.cc 8P -P5G .138. ess idgood Timothy Williams, Police fficer in Freddie Gray Case s
Ac uitted of All Char es, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2016),https: www.nytimes.com 2016 05 24 us baltimore-officer-edward-nero-freddie-gray-court-verdict https: perma.cc 2 V-R HY (describingacquittal of Officer Edward Nero) ess idgood Sheryl Gay Stolberg,
Ac uittal in Freddie Gray Case Casts Doubts About Future rials, N.Y. Times( une 23, 2016), https: www.nytimes.com 2016 06 24 us verdict-freddie-gray-caesar-goodson-baltimore.html https: perma.cc DP2 -FFTR(describing acquittal of Officer Caesar R. Goodson r.).139. Sheryl Gay Stolberg ess idgood, All Char es Dropped A ainst Baltimore
fficers in Freddie Gray Case, N.Y. TIMES ( uly 27, 2016),https: www.nytimes.com 2016 07 28 us charges-dropped-against-3-remaining-officers-in-freddie-gray-case https: perma.cc D9 5-C3H9 .140. See supra Part I and note 38.
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prosecutors in this context lets these other actors off the hook. There arelessons here for prosecutors. ut these are old lessons. Prosecutors, nomatter what their guiding philosophy, must follow the rules and shouldhave no interest in prosecuting the innocent. ackson needed prosecutorialcompetence, not progressive lenience. She also needed thorough policeinvestigation, a stronger defense, open-minded udges and uries, and well-functioning parole and pardon systems.II. ILDING ANEWNARRATIVEa elon uses the two stories described in the preceding Part toillustrate the power of prosecutors and the appeal of progressiveprosecution. rooklyn’s progressive prosecutors did the right thing bygiving evin a break.141 Tennessee’s win-at-all-costs prosecutors did thewrong thing by sending ackson to prison despite her potentialinnocence.142 To my mind, the stories illustrate different things. evin’sstory illustrates the challenges and potential of the progressiveprosecution movement a movement that can leverage the often-overlooked power of prosecutorial lenience to check the State’s power topunish the factually guilty. ackson’s story says less about progressiveprosecutors and nothing about lenience. It reveals the State’s power topunish even the factually innocent so long as all of the criminal usticeactors act in concert. In doing so, it highlights the importance of police,udges, uries, governors, and parole boards.Declining to prosecute the innocent is not a progressive position. It is aconsensus position. That’s why when it comes to cases of factualuncertainty like ackson’s, the real protagonists are the investigators. Ifpolice generate sufficient evidence of guilt (or innocence), this kind ofuncertainty disappears. When police fail to uncover exculpatory evidence,defense attorneys become critical. uries too must play a role. When uriesre ect the prosecution’s evidence in weak cases, prosecutors becomereluctant to bring those cases. In fact, rooklyn’s uries may explainevin’s lenient outcome better than rooklyn’s prosecutors. DavidDorfman and Chris Ii ima report that in the early 1990s, rooklyn urieswere acquitting in gun possession cases at an average rate of 56 . 143That’s shockingly high. Dorfman and II ima suggest that because the
141. AZELON, supra note 11, at 296.142. d. at 297.143. David N. Dorfman Chris . Ii ima, Fictions, Fault, and For iveness Jury
ullification in A ew Conte t, 28 . MICH. .L. REFORM 861, 887 (1995).
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prosecutors know that rooklyn uries will very likely acquit adefendant in a garden variety’ gun possession case, they have little choicebut to offer more attractive plea deals.144 The prosecutors in evin’s casewould be well aware of the difficulty of convicting in his garden varietycase. The opposite dynamic likely worked against ackson, whose fateultimately rested in the hands not of a Tennessee prosecutor but aTennessee ury.The two scenarios also highlight very different strands ofprosecutorial reform: one that seeks to use prosecutors to reform thesystem and another that seeks to reform prosecutors themselves. Thelatter strand, which is at play in ackson’s case, is ancient. Prosecutorsmust play fair, uphold the Constitution, and carefully weigh the evidence.This is the theme of the 1935 case Ber er v. nited States, which famouslycommands that prosecutors, as servants of the law, must hew closely tothe rules while ensuring that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. 145As Ber er recogni ed, we don’t need transformative prosecutors to guardagainst convictions of the innocent, we ust need competent prosecutors.Competent police, uries, udges, governors, and parole boards are evenmore important. y contrast, the strand of reform at issue in evin’s caseis new, bringing the transformative power of prosecutorial lenience out ofthe shadows. Distinguishing between the prosecutors’ roles in these twoscenarios allows a clearer vision of the places where we can expect a newwave of prosecutors to transform the criminal ustice system.What makes evin’s case important on a larger stage is that, incontrast to ackson’s case, evin’s factual guilt of the charged offense isclear (even if the likelihood of conviction was uncertain). Disagreementabout what the prosecutor should do in evin’s case turns on contestedconceptuali ations of the prosecutorial role. As a elon frames it, thequestion becomes whether evin deserved, or the community benefitsfrom, a mandatory 3.5-year sentence.146 After all, if we accept evin’sversion, he was merely trying to help his friend avoid a gun conviction. Tobroaden the discussion, we could ask similar questions whenever
144. d. at n.143. Dorfman and Ii ima suggest that the prosecutors reacted to thehigh acquittal rates by weeding-out sic the cases that may be in the leastbit problematic at trial resulting in a lower acquittal rate in subsequentyears. d. Still, a elon notes that in the first year of the gun court, one thirdof the trials resulted in an acquittal. AZELON, supra note 11, at 136.145. erger v. nited States, 295 .S. 78, 88 (1935).146. AZELON, supra note 11, at xxiii.
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prosecutors disagree with unpopular laws, like mari uana or shopliftingoffenses, or severe mandatory or udicially-imposed sentences.There is no consensus on the prosecutors’ role in circumstances likethose in evin’s case. This is where progressive prosecution becomes acoherent concept, distinct from traditional calls for competent, thoughtful,and non-corrupt prosecution. nlike a traditional by-the-bookprosecutor, the new wave of prosecutors a elon chronicles can serve as acheck on the system’s severity by counteracting overly-punitive police,legislatures, udges, and uries even in cases, like evin’s, when thedefendant’s guilt is clear.In a democratic system characteri ed by mass incarceration, there is astrong argument for policy-based prosecutor lenience. Too muchprosecutorial power is problematic, but lenience is different. Obviously, allwould be outraged if the legislature repealed the gun laws and theprosecutor nevertheless sent evin to prison for gun possession. Thatwould violate the system’s checks and balances. The rooklyn prosecutors’decision to divert evin’s case is the opposite. Like the police officer whodeclines to ticket a speeding motorist, letting evin pass through theustice system without a conviction is an example of checks and balancesin operation. Contrary to the critics, this form of prosecutorial power thepower to dictate lenience is both consistent with the system’s design andfaithful to traditional worries about the accumulation of prosecutor power.When it comes to prosecutorial lenience, then, more prosecutor poweris better and (contrary to traditional academic voices) the best reform for
that power is no reform.147 Prosecutors can already offer leniency withoutcheck. This is the power reform-minded prosecutors and their supporterscan leverage unapologetically to temper the overly punitive dynamics ofAmerican criminal ustice.There remains the concern about how prosecutors dispense leniency.Prosecutors may offer leniency inequitably, unfairly, or even corruptly.This concern applies throughout the criminal ustice system, to otheractors such as police, parole boards, legislatures, and governors. The bestanswer with respect to prosecutors is that there are political limits. If aprosecutor acts too leniently, her constituents can vote her out of office.Commentators downplay the prospect that political accountability cancontrol wayward prosecutors.148 ut this critique only resonates in the
147. Cf. ellin, Reassessin Prosecutorial Power, supra note 16, at 854 (critiquingreform proposals like legislative plea bargaining guidelines as more likely toincrease than decrease severity).148. See, e. ., Stephanos ibas, ransparency and Participation in Criminal
Procedure, 81 N.Y. . L. REV. 911, 931-46 (2006) ruce Green Ellen
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context of undue severity.149 Voters can, and do, counteract excessiveleniency. Two of the most prominent progressive prosecution victories (inChicago and St. Louis) channeled voter dissatisfaction with incumbents’decisions not to vigorously pursue cases.150 In 2018, California votersrecalled a udge who imposed a lenient sentence in a sexual assault case.151And American politicians across the nation famously worry about thethreat of being Willie Horton’ed,’ i.e., targeted by negative campaignadvertisements highlighting lenient criminal policy choices.152Guidance regarding how prosecutors should exercise leniency invarious circumstances is beyond the scope of this Essay. Here, the questionis whether it is proper to offer leniency based on a policy disagreementwith the legislature or other actors. An affirmative answer is criticallyimportant because it substantially expands the limits of permissibleprosecutorial action in an era of mass incarceration. How exactlyprosecutors should operate within those limits is a question for anotherpiece.153
Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability . , 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51, 66(2017) Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail s, 6 OHIO ST. . CRIM.L. 581, 582 (2009).149. See Rachel E. arkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencin , 105 COL M. L.REV. 1276, 1281 (2005) ( A n opponent’s charge that they are soft on crimecan be devastating to their political futures because it resonates withvoters. ) William . Stunt , he Patholo ical Politics of Criminal Law, 100MICH. L. REV. 505, 530 (2001) (suggesting that voters seek conviction andpunishment of people who commit the kinds of offenses that voters fear ).150. See Note, he Parado of Pro ressive Prosecution, 132 HARV. L. REV. 748,754-55 (2018) (chronicling the trend in the context of police shootings).151. See Maggie Astor, California oters Remove Jud e Aaron Persky, Who Gave a
Month Sentence for Se ual Assault, N.Y. TIMES ( une 6, 2018),https: www.nytimes.com 2018 06 06 us politics udge-persky-brock-turner-recall.html https: perma.cc 7F Z-ANR4 see also Stephen F. Smith,
he Supreme Court and the Politics of Death, 94 VA. L. REV. 283, 329 n.161(2008) (describing the famous example of three California Supreme Courtustices . . . defeated in reelection campaigns in 1986 based on a record thatwas decidedly hostile to the death penalty. ).152. See eth Schwart apfel ill eller, Willie Horton Revisited, MARSHALLPRO ECT (May 13, 2015) (describing the phenomenon),https: www.themarshallpro ect.org 2015 05 13 willie-horton-revisitedhttps: perma.cc R D5-7G9 .153. See enerally ellin, heories of Prosecution, supra note 17 (discussingnormative theories of prosecution).
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In a time of rapidly changing perceptions of prosecutors, it is critical tofind consensus on the appropriate boundaries of prosecutorial power. Thisis especially true when the boundaries evolving in the real world appear tobe in tension with traditional academic critiques. y sketching broad butneutral boundaries, this Essay responds to powerful structural ob ectionsto prosecutor-driven reform: specifically, that (1) prosecutors are alreadytoo powerful and (2) should play a more restricted, less partisan role thatdoes not usurp legislators, udges, or uries. The best answer to theseob ections is not, as one commonly hears, that all-powerful prosecutorscan do whatever they or their voters want.154 a elon, for example,reassures us that: We, the people, elect state prosecutors, and that meanstheir power is our power. 155 ut in a democracy, our rarely meanseveryone. And this framing offers no limits beyond what a ma ority ofvoters in any locality can stand. I think a better answer and one thatplaces some limits on prosecutorial might is that many of the actors inthe American criminal ustice system, including the prosecutor, possess aunilateral power to dispense lenience. When any one of those actorsinvokes that power, it is an example of the system’s checks and balances inoperation, not a breakdown of the rule of law.CONCL SIONReaders of Emily a elon’s excellent new book, Char ed, will find herenthusiasm for the burgeoning prosecutor-driven reform movementcontagious. ut contrary to the academic voices upon which she builds, thekey to the movement’s success is not prosecutorial omnipotence. It is theopposite. Local prosecutors are not (and should not be) benevolentdictators presiding over the criminal ustice system even if we like theirpolitics. Instead, the movement can highlight limits on prosecutorial might.
154. See, e. ., rooklyn Defender Services, Power of Prosecutors, YO T E (Sep. 10,2017), https: www.youtube.com watch v rgvlx7MnqAhttps: perma.cc 2A- D8 ( What the public wants to have happen iswhat the District Attorney should be doing. ) atherine . Moy et al.,Stanford Criminal ustice Ctr., Rate My District Attorney owards a Scorecard
for Prosecutors ffices, STAN. L. SCH. 4 (2018), https: www-cdn.law.stanford.edu wp-content uploads 2018 01 Rate My District Attorney anuary 2018.pdfhttps: perma.cc 9N3R- 6AF (proposing ratings to reveal whether aprosecutors’ office has effectively pursued the electorate’s policypriorities. ).155. AZELON, supra note 11, at xxviii.
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW 39 : 218 2020
248
Prosecutors exercise power across two dimensions, and both arerestricted. When prosecutors exercise lenience, the local electorate canenforce limits at the ballot box. When prosecutors seek to invoke theState’s power to punish, police, legislatures, udges, uries, and other actorsdetermine the prosecutor’s success. As a result, progressive prosecutorsand their champions can celebrate the system’s checks and balancesalongside a narrow form of prosecutorial power: leniency. Indeed, areminder that prosecutorial leniency is ust one of the system’s manychecks on the State’s power to punish may turn out to be the mostimportant lesson progressive prosecutors have to offer.
